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Mar 11th
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Home arrow Terrorism arrow Terrorism Profile
Terrorism Profile
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb/Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) PDF Print E-mail
by J.B. Hill   

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The Salafist Group for Call and Combat, known by their French acronym GSPC, was formed in 1998 after breaking off from another violent Islamist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Believing the GIA attacks against Algerian civilians were hurting the Islamists’ cause, the GSPC vowed not to target indiscriminately.1 Since their breakaway from the GIA, the GSPC has become the primary Islamist force in Algeria. Though still partially adhering to their original goal of overthrowing the secular Algerian state and installing a system based on Islamic law, the GSPC’s aims have broadened as they have grown closer to al Qaeda.

The GSPC has been tentatively tied to al Qaeda since at least 2003, when they made a declaration of allegiance to the organization, but they were not publicly accepted into the network until late 2006 when Ayman al-Zawahiri released a tape officially announcing the merger.2 In January 2007, the GSPC changed its name to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, further tying the two organizations together.3

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Al Qaeda Today Recomposed Hierarchical Organization or Pan-Islamic Ideological Movement? PDF Print E-mail
by Brig Barker   

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Many would say that Al Qaeda historically was an efficient, well-financed, and sophisticated organization prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Since the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S., the destruction of the terrorist training camps, and the target displacement of the previously identified leadership, the entity of Al Qaeda has undergone extensive reorganization. As such, the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities must unequivocally determine the existing state of the previously defined organization. Logically, questions most likely arise regarding whether the entity is a re-formed, yet smaller organization or if it has evolved into a global pan-Islamic social movement. With an established answer to this question, more appropriate strategic and tactical policies – both foreign and domestic – can be developed to defeat or potentially thwart the group’s activities worldwide. This paper will seek to answer this question. The benchmark against which the entity will be defined will be Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas’ (2003) definition of an organization. Stojkovic et al. define an organization as “a collective that has some identifiable boundary and internal structure and that engages in activities related to some complex set of goals” (p. 6). Nevertheless, to establish a clear understanding of the entity, a brief history of its origins and dismantlement will first be provided. Subsequently, an analysis of its current state, to include an in-depth look at its organizational structure, leadership, communications, and recruiting, will take place. This will set the stage for further dissection to include a determination as to whether it fits the classic definition of an “organization.” Finally, the paper will utilize the findings to further identify potential vulnerabilities in the entity to be used as considerations by the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities.

Although appearing to be a simple task, determining the entity’s current state of being requires extensive analysis. Specifically this requires first unpacking what an organization actually looks like. Stojkovic et al. define an organization based on three important factors: structure, purpose, and activity. With this, an organization can be viewed as a bureaucratic structure with a rigid hierarchy of offices and an established division of labor as characterized by Weber (1947). This, of course, was historically accurate, but given the multiplication of nebulous entities potentially defined as organizations there may be more appropriate options. Stojkovic et al. also outline the importance of purpose in an organization. Here they detail the quickly emerging complexities in defining the entity’s purpose. For the purpose of this paper, Al Qaeda’s goals will be measured against Etzioni’s (1964) definition of organizations as “social units deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals” (p. 5). Finally, in looking at Stojkovic et al.’s definition of an organization, the third essential factor for consideration is that of the group’s activities. Specifically, one question that should be answered is whether the organization itself carries out activities or if there are conglomerate entities that act on behalf of the group itself. Graphically speaking, are the group’s activities solidly connected to the subgroup’s activities or can the relationship be represented as a dotted line? All in all, the totality of the above three factors will be considered in review of Al Qaeda’s activities.

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Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah PDF Print E-mail
by J. B. Hill   

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The Southeastern Asian militant Islamist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), is the most dangerous terrorist group in the region. With roots in the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia begun in the 1950s, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir established JI as part of a struggle to create an Islamic Caliphate throughout Indonesia. While the movement has roots going back decades, JI came into its own during the period of the Afghan Jihad in the late 1980s, as the group sent many members to join in the fight against the Soviet Union.

In Afghanistan, JI established links with the burgeoning al Qaeda movement, led by the then mostly unknown Osama bin Laden. Upon the end of the Jihad, the groups maintained and improved their ties, with al Qaeda providing operational support to JI. Personnel cooperation between the two groups, notably in the person of Hambali (though he is just one example) has led to a close working relationship. In 2000, JI conducted its first major attack with the assistance and support of al Qaeda in a series of bombings on Christmas Eve, killing 18 and wounding many others. In 2002, on the anniversary of the USS Cole attack in Yemen, al Qaeda provided the funding necessary to carry out the most destructive bombings in Indonesian history, now known as the Bali Bombings. The attack involved coordinated bombings inside and outside a popular night club, ensuring many of the fleeing patrons would be killed. In addition, there was a small bombing outside the U.S. Consulate coordinated to detonate at nearly the same time, causing only minor damage. All told, the attack killed 202 people and wounded 209.

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