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A Reflective and Critical Introduction Social Change, Crime, and Criminology in China |
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by Jianming Mei and Mu Wang
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As a discipline, we may date the origins of criminology to Cesare Lombroso, who is considered by many as the father of criminology. Since then, criminology has developed quickly in many countries. Comparatively, criminology in China lags behind western countries. Nevertheless, criminology, along with other disciplines of social science, has got the impetus of development in China in the past two decades since the late 1970s. This paper will outline the history of criminology in China, introduce institutions that accommodate criminological research and education, review criminological research focusing on debates on substantial issues and the challenges to criminological researchers in China, and finally summarize conclusions about the development of criminology in China.
History of Criminology in China
There are three developmental stages of criminology in China: the first stage before 1949; the second stage between 1949 and 1978; and the third stage after 1978.
The First Stage-Before 1949
The earliest criminological studies available in China can be traced back to the 1920s (Broadhurst & Liu, 2004); Lombroso’s work was translated into Chinese and published in 1922. The first Chinese textbook on criminology was published in 1932 (Cao, 2003). In the 1920s and 1930s, after the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 1911, China was in turmoil and mired in wars between warlords; social problems like poverty and crime were rampant. While political activists were ardent in their support for new ideologies like utilitarianism, anarchism, and communism, some scholars tried to find alternative approaches to the ills of society. Chinese scholars began research in the fields of criminology, sociology, and anthropology. These Chinese pioneers and their works had great influence at that time, and even now. For example, Dr. Ching-Yeh Yen conducted his field work in prisons in Beijing and produced a Ph.D. dissertation entitled, “Crime in Relation to Social Change in China.” He earned a doctorate from the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago in 1934. After he passed away, his wife, Ms. Jieqiong Lei, who was a sociologist at Beijing University and one-time vice chairperson of China’s National People’s Congress, acted as adviser to China’s Society of Criminology. |
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Counterintelligence Applications to Law Enforcement |
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by Brian Kelley
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“The problem with counterintelligence practitioners is that you are always counted on to bring bad news to the party.” Career counterintelligence professionals have become inured to hearing variants of this kind of false and dismissive commentary which are usually buffeted by pejorative connotations. To most of us who have spent our careers in the shadowy world of counterintelligence, these negative assertions have been long accepted as part of the price of doing business, especially when we are put in the often precarious position of “speaking truth to power.”
Why has there been such a pervasive aura of negativity surrounding our discipline? In my more than forty years of government service, which has included being an active practitioner working every facet of counterintelligence in both domestic and overseas venues, it is patently apparent that one of the underlying causes for treating counterintelligence as the proverbial “skunk at the picnic” lies in the fact that, outside our profession, few intelligence professionals have any real understanding as to what constitutes the parameters of our specialization.
The art of counterintelligence is often referred to as the least-known, the least-understood, and certainly among the least-appreciated of all the intelligence disciplines. Surrounding and contributing to the lack of understanding of what counterintelligence can bring to the table is a well-known fact that the federal agencies which constitute the major players in the CI arena, namely the FBI, CIA, NSA and the Department of Defense, all contribute to the semantic vagaries which underpin the lack of common agreement as to what counterintelligence actually means and how it should be employed in both its defensive and offensive modes. As a result, each organization interprets and executes its counterintelligence missions in a myriad of different ways which can significantly impair or obviate a consensus-driven definition of the term. |
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