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Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb/Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)

by J.B. Hill

The Salafist Group for Call and Combat, known by their French acronym GSPC, was formed in 1998 after breaking off from another violent Islamist organization, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Believing the GIA attacks against Algerian civilians were hurting the Islamists’ cause, the GSPC vowed not to target indiscriminately.¹ Since their breakaway from the GIA, the GSPC has become the primary Islamist force in Algeria. Though still partially adhering to their original goal of overthrowing the secular Algerian state and installing a system based on Islamic law, the GSPC’s aims have broadened as they have grown closer to al Qaeda.

The GSPC has been tentatively tied to al Qaeda since at least 2003, when they made a declaration of allegiance to the organization, but they were not publicly accepted into the network until late 2006 when Ayman al-Zawahiri released a tape officially announcing the merger.² In January 2007, the GSPC changed its name to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, further tying the two organizations together.³

Azerbaijan The Fight Against Terrorist Financing

by Mahammad Imanli and Shahin Nasrullayev

‘Terrorism is one of the most serious modern global social problems and represents a threat to all humanity.’ Such an erroneous opinion is widely disseminated as if terrorism is the result of a brand new era. Terrorism has been present alongside humanity throughout its history as a method of deciding political or social problems through the use of violence. In the modern world, terrorism becomes the means of solving literally all problems, using intervention in the internal policies of any state. For terrorists, a high level of aggression – a refusal to acknowledge universal values – is characteristic. In addressing terrorism individually – putting out brushfires – no country in the world will cope with this evil. On the contrary, processes can take on an unmanageable nature. Collective actions are necessary for the eradication of this phenomenon. Everyone who participates in the fight against terrorism should understand clearly that on them lays the responsibility not only for events in their own country, but also the destiny of the whole world.

As is known, the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, in the United States led to the significant activation of the struggle against terrorism in many countries of the world. The urgency of this problem in providing security for governments and their people was noted in a number of decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations. Resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations from September, 12, 2001, No. 1368, has called on the international community to increase efforts for the warning and suppression of terrorism, including increasing coordination and the full implementation in national legislation of antiterrorist Conventions and Resolutions of the Security Council.

The subsequent Resolution of the Security Council from September 28, 2001, No. 1373, established that all states are obliged to prevent and stop the financing of terrorist organizations and groups and to make corresponding amendments and additions to national laws. It is worth emphasizing that earlier a similar position of the international community on this question had been included in the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing of December 9, 1999, entering into force the next year.

Al Qaeda Today Recomposed Hierarchical Organization or Pan-Islamic Ideological Movement?

by Brig Barker

Many would say that Al Qaeda historically was an efficient, well-financed, and sophisticated organization prior to the events of September 11, 2001. Since the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S., the destruction of the terrorist training camps, and the target displacement of the previously identified leadership, the entity of Al Qaeda has undergone extensive reorganization. As such, the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities must unequivocally determine the existing state of the previously defined organization. Logically, questions most likely arise regarding whether the entity is a re-formed, yet smaller organization or if it has evolved into a global pan-Islamic social movement. With an established answer to this question, more appropriate strategic and tactical policies – both foreign and domestic – can be developed to defeat or potentially thwart the group’s activities worldwide. This paper will seek to answer this question. The benchmark against which the entity will be defined will be Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas’ (2003) definition of an organization. Stojkovic et al. define an organization as “a collective that has some identifiable boundary and internal structure and that engages in activities related to some complex set of goals” (p. 6). Nevertheless, to establish a clear understanding of the entity, a brief history of its origins and dismantlement will first be provided. Subsequently, an analysis of its current state, to include an in-depth look at its organizational structure, leadership, communications, and recruiting, will take place. This will set the stage for further dissection to include a determination as to whether it fits the classic definition of an “organization.” Finally, the paper will utilize the findings to further identify potential vulnerabilities in the entity to be used as considerations by the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities.

Although appearing to be a simple task, determining the entity’s current state of being requires extensive analysis. Specifically this requires first unpacking what an organization actually looks like. Stojkovic et al. define an organization based on three important factors: structure, purpose, and activity. With this, an organization can be viewed as a bureaucratic structure with a rigid hierarchy of offices and an established division of labor as characterized by Weber (1947). This, of course, was historically accurate, but given the multiplication of nebulous entities potentially defined as organizations there may be more appropriate options. Stojkovic et al. also outline the importance of purpose in an organization. Here they detail the quickly emerging complexities in defining the entity’s purpose. For the purpose of this paper, Al Qaeda’s goals will be measured against Etzioni’s (1964) definition of organizations as “social units deliberately constructed and reconstructed to seek specific goals” (p. 5). Finally, in looking at Stojkovic et al.’s definition of an organization, the third essential factor for consideration is that of the group’s activities. Specifically, one question that should be answered is whether the organization itself carries out activities or if there are conglomerate entities that act on behalf of the group itself. Graphically speaking, are the group’s activities solidly connected to the subgroup’s activities or can the relationship be represented as a dotted line? All in all, the totality of the above three factors will be considered in review of Al Qaeda’s activities.

Southeast Asia: Jemaah Islamiyah

by J. B. Hill

The Southeastern Asian militant Islamist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), is the most dangerous terrorist group in the region. With roots in the Darul Islam movement in Indonesia begun in the 1950s, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir established JI as part of a struggle to create an Islamic Caliphate throughout Indonesia. While the movement has roots going back decades, JI came into its own during the period of the Afghan Jihad in the late 1980s, as the group sent many members to join in the fight against the Soviet Union.

In Afghanistan, JI established links with the burgeoning al Qaeda movement, led by the then mostly unknown Osama bin Laden. Upon the end of the Jihad, the groups maintained and improved their ties, with al Qaeda providing operational support to JI. Personnel cooperation between the two groups, notably in the person of Hambali (though he is just one example) has led to a close working relationship. In 2000, JI conducted its first major attack with the assistance and support of al Qaeda in a series of bombings on Christmas Eve, killing 18 and wounding many others. In 2002, on the anniversary of the USS Cole attack in Yemen, al Qaeda provided the funding necessary to carry out the most destructive bombings in Indonesian history, now known as the Bali Bombings. The attack involved coordinated bombings inside and outside a popular night club, ensuring many of the fleeing patrons would be killed. In addition, there was a small bombing outside the U.S. Consulate coordinated to detonate at nearly the same time, causing only minor damage. All told, the attack killed 202 people and wounded 209.

The Human Audit: Interviewing the Islamic Extremist

by Barry L. McManus

Barry L. McManus If one's goal is to identify potential terrorists (those seeking to enter the United States to engage in potentially hostile activities), the first opportunity occurs when the potential terrorist attempts to enter the United States. The facts: Twenty-six al-Qaeda terrorist conspirators – eighteen Saudis, two Emiratis, one Egyptian, one Lebanese, one Moroccan, one Pakistani, and two Yemenis – sought to enter the United States for the specific purpose of carrying out a suicide mission. The first member of this team began to acquire the means to enter the United States two years and five months before the 9/11 attack.

Three of the conspirators were “known or knowable” by intelligence authorities as al-Qaeda terrorists in early 2000, but their biographic information was not fully developed or provided to border authorities for the watch list at U.S. consulates abroad (by State Department) and at the border (by Immigration and Customs border inspectors).

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