Preliminary Issues: Types of Terrorism, Modus Operandi, and Terror Targeting

The multifaceted and nefarious threats that terrorists represent encompass traditional challenges (e.g., bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, and assassinations) and modern threats such as cyberterrorism and superterrorism (e.g., biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear). Terrorist threats can be categorized in two principal ways (Alexander, 2004).

The first relates to threats based on the type of target involved. Terrorists have targeted civilian and military interests, businesses and infrastructure sites, and government, religious, and civic facilities. The record demonstrates that no segment of the population has been immune from terrorism. Terrorists, unfortunately, do not view any target as off limits. Terrorists even justify killing innocent children in the name of their higher cause (Alexander, 2004).

A second type of targeting can be analyzed by the modus operandi used to undertake attacks: traditional operations, superterrorism, and cyberterrorism. The expanding terror trends include resorting to suicide bombings, spectacular attacks, and simultaneous incidents. Terrorist attacks can occur anywhere and at anytime (Alexander, 2004).

Terrorists have already carried out attacks against a multitude of targets by using several tactics simultaneously. Although some modifications as to the modus operandi are inevitable—using explosive-laden boats to attack highly-populated targets such as passenger cruise ships—the future trend is towards eye-catching attacks with resulting mass casualties and mayhem. The relative ease and potential frequency of uncomplicated attacks like suicide bombers may actually instill greater fear than larger-scale incidents (Alexander, 2004).

When terrorism becomes a near daily occurrence (as in the case of Iraq), terrorists are able to essentially destabilize a country. As such, and given the trend of decentralization and “franchising” of some terror groups (e.g., al Qaeda and other Jihadists), particularly since U.S. activities in Afghanistan, smaller but more rapidly successive attacks are likely to occur (Alexander, 2006). The probability of terror attacks increasingly being carried out by smaller groups as well as “self-selected” or lone terrorists will make predicting targets and impeding plots more difficult than with larger terror operations. This will be due, in part, to fewer participants in the plot and greater challenges in finding, infiltrating, or coming in contact with the perpetrators. Therefore, it is imperative that law enforcement proves more adept at identifying terrorists before they undertake attacks.

Terrorists, Terror Groups, and Recruitment Issues

The prevailing mindset that only male adults are involved in terrorist groups must be changed. There has been a rise in women participating in terrorist operations, particularly in suicide bombings, as exemplified by Sri Lankan, Palestinian, Chechen, and (most recently) Western European women (e.g., Turkish and Belgian, the latter a convert to Islam who undertook a suicide attack in Iraq). Moreover, in the past, women carried out significant leadership and operational roles in terrorist groups, including: Baader-Meinhof whose co-founder was a woman, Symbionese Liberation Organization (Patty Hearst was involved in a bank robbery), and Tamil Tigers (a woman suicide bomber killed Indian Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi) (Alexander, 2004).

The use and recruitment of children by terrorist groups, though reprehensible, is real and growing. From September 2000 through March 2004, Palestinian youths carried out nearly 30 suicide bombing missions (Alexander, 2004). In the United States, domestic and international terror groups reach out to youths in various forums including at: educational and religious institutions; student organizations; boys and girls clubs; concerts and parties; meetings; online websites and chat rooms; cell phones and instant messaging; and “old fashioned” flyers left on cars and homes (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006; Anti-Defamation League, 2006a). In addition, a heightened police awareness of possible affiliation with gangs, radical groups, or criminal acts in support of terrorism is important.

While much attention has been paid to organized, hierarchical terror groups whose members receive training, weapons, funds, and operational direction “from above,” patrol officers may come across individual members of such groups or unaffiliated terrorists. Police should also be careful not to ignore the lone wolf or self-appointed terrorist (WGEM, 2006). There are a number of terrorists that undertook (or planned) attacks on their own, including Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski and Eric Rudolph, who carried out bombings at the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park, an abortion clinic, and a gay bar (Alexander, 2004). More recently, two self-appointed jihadists—Naveed Afzal Haq (Murakami, 2006) and Derrick Shareef (Creglow, 2006; Curry, 2006)—were involved in terror plots on U.S. soil.

“Profiling,” Stereotyping, and Terrorists

As noted, police should also not fall into the trap of thinking that terrorism is associated only with males. Similar stereotyping could likewise (wrongfully) attach with regards to individuals of a particular race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin. There are numerous radical (in some cases terrorist) organizations in the United States that are comprised of all ethnic origins, beliefs, and races or solely constituted of one type. Radical domestic movements such as: the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF), Animal Liberation Front (ALF), other single issue groups (e.g., anti-abortionists), right-wing hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis, sovereign citizen movement, and radical militias are all violence-prone (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006; Anti-Defamation League, 2006a). In the post-9/11 public perspective, some may not “look like a terrorist.” Yet, they are all of the same thread of criminals acting for political, social, or religious goals. Additionally, U.S. government focus on Arab and Muslim terrorist groups, especially al Qaeda-linked or Jihadist-inspired organizations, has resulted in law enforcement’s particular attention to members of those communities at the exclusion of home-grown, or “Westernized,” actors.

That is not to say all members of such domestic groups engage in terrorist activities, but, police should remain open to that possibility. Many act alone, and not in concert with traditionally established organizations. For example, a self-proclaimed white supremacist named Eric Nelson resided in a far northern suburb of Chicago. He possessed numerous indicators of white supremacy, including tattoos, a shaved head, racist literature, and he admitted it to police. Still, he was considered a lone wolf, and not a real threat. That was until he entered a major grocery store in 2000 and opened fire on civilians and police.

Thus, it is critical that patrols do not undertake racial, religious, ethnic, or national-origin-based profiling in their quest to uncover terrorist threats. Such conduct is, after all, improper from an ethical perspective and illegal with potential for civil rights violations. In fact, such illegal police conduct tends to alienate specific communities that potentially could assist police in uncovering the few bad actors that might reside in particular communities.

In essence, post-September 11 community policing requires building bridges and gaining insight from local communities and their leaders that likewise find political violence abhorrent. Officers should be increasingly aware of these potential links and undertake efforts to construct or strengthen them, as the case may be.

At the same time, it is difficult to argue that particular groups of people are not more likely affiliated with or supportive of specific extremist or terror causes (e.g., whites more likely affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis than blacks or Hispanics; Arabs and Muslims are more likely connected with al Qaeda than Jews). Some terrorist organizations are more likely to recruit (or gain interest from) specific segments of the populace—by gender, age, and socio-economic levels—although terrorists do gain membership among both genders, all ages, and from rich to poor.

Moreover, terror groups also seek prospective members from outside their traditional recruitment targets, such as al Qaeda trying to recruit “Western-looking” people and converts to Islam. Al Qaeda member Richard Reid, for instance, was a British citizen of Jamaican descent and a Muslim convert. Reid tried to ignite a shoe bomb on a Paris-Miami flight in 2001. His incorporation into al Qaeda is indicative of terror groups’ interest in using individuals that are less likely associated with a particular group. Also, Reid’s citizenship allowed for greater ease of entry into the United States (via legitimate means) than face greater scrutiny if he was a citizen of an Arab or Muslim country (Alexander, 2004). Similarly, some lone or self-appointed terrorists undertake actions for a particular cause without sharing traditional characteristics.

Other Terrorist Indicators and Terrorist Activities in the Economic System

Terrorists and their supporters take advantage of opportunities and loopholes in the economic system to further their murderous goals. Leveraging the fruits of the economic system enables terrorists to obtain financial, organizational, and operational assistance (e.g., arms, training, intelligence, and sponsorship) (Alexander, 2004).

Terrorists and their abettors utilize existing traditional frameworks—such as companies and nonprofit entities—to raise funds, receive support, and integrate themselves into the community. Traditional and nontraditional financial mechanisms present in the economic systems are used as well (Alexander, 2004; Ohio, 2003).

Perpetrators of political violence also undertake a variety of criminal activities such as counterfeiting currency, credit cards, and ATM cards; misappropriating and using credit card information; forging documents; identity theft; money laundering; drug trafficking; corruption; commercial espionage; and general criminal activities. These are crimes that police encounter on a daily basis.

The costs of undertaking terrorist attacks range from a few dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Obviously, depending on the size of the group, sophistication of weaponry, training, and complexity of the operation, the costs can vary dramatically. Although the 9/11 attacks are estimated to have cost some $500,000, the costs associated with a stabbing, bomb threat, or the sending of flour (initially presumed to be anthrax) are negligible. Thus, police must well comprehend that terrorism can be considered “warfare on the cheap,” and as such can be perpetrated by poorly-funded individuals or groups and not solely large, sophisticated terror groups, particularly those that are state sponsored (Alexander, 2004).

Patrol officers are more likely than other law enforcement to have contact with residents of a community (or within a beat) who are also members of terrorist groups. This truism will arise primarily due to their interactions in their patrol activities. For instance, contact may occur during a traffic stop or on a service call. As such, police should especially be made aware of terrorists in the economic system: terrorists getting jobs, renting apartments, buying products and services used in furtherance of their activities (e.g., cell phones, components of bombs like fertilizer and racing fuel, and storage facilities) (Alexander, 2004).

Other related actions may include funding their activities through the use of financial institutions, charities, or undertaking criminal acts (Alexander, 2004; Seper, 2004; U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). Terrorists may associate themselves with others in their own or neighboring communities with potentially similar mindsets or possible recruitment candidate pools. Better comprehension of these realities by patrol officers will aid in uncovering potential terror ties more rapidly than when such issues did not appear relevant.

In sum, a greater appreciation of disparate terrorist groups, membership, recruitment schemes, modus operandi, targets, activities in the economic system (including financing), access to current intelligence, and media reports will enhance patrol officers’ understanding of what they are looking for in uncovering terrorists while on a traffic stop or during a call for service.

Terrorism Indicators and Traffic Stops

Preliminary Issues

Law enforcement has been utilizing traffic stops for decades to detect criminal activity. Drug interdiction strategies by patrol officers have had a huge impact on illegal drug trafficking. That same interdiction strategy by patrol officers can make an important contribution in combating terrorism.

Police should go on the offensive and aggressively look for signs of terrorist activity or involvement. Granted, police are bound by constitutional law. However, as has been evidenced by drug interdiction strategies, police have had great success in getting into vehicles for the purpose of discovering illegal drug activity. The same will be true of countering terrorist activity should law enforcement efforts rise to the occasion.

Still, it is not uncommon for police officers to unintentionally overlook illegal substances, weapons, and drug paraphernalia during traffic stops. Some police officers and trainers believed that an inadvertently overlooked or missed criminal activity while on patrol is not a tragedy. The thought was that it was essential for an officer to conduct a rapid, traditional traffic stop, write a ticket, and safely finish a shift. Extraordinary inquiries, which could force an encounter leading to additional work (e.g., several guestions to driver, checking databases, or plain view searches) and potential inefficiencies (e.g., not writing enough tickets or working quickly enough) were discouraged by some patrol officers and supervisors. Another mindset foresaw that the placing of an officer in greater risk of injury or death should be eschewed.

Such attitudes should never be acceptable. It is certainly not warranted in today’s environment. More specifically, in the post-9/11 setting, missed opportunities for intervention could result in catastrophes of monumental proportions (e.g., detonation of a “dirty bomb” or, worse, a nuclear warhead). It is extremely difficult to ascertain what is a terrorist activity at first glance. On the surface, illegal activity may be viewed as traditional crime that is driven by profit or hedonism. However, drug and other criminal activity may be associated with funding terrorist groups and their illegal activities.

Police officers will most likely encounter individuals through traffic stops. So what should police look for? People engaging in terrorist activity will most likely use a rental car or a stolen car to avoid the vehicle being traced back to them or their group. Officers should look for temporary license plates and rental company stickers. They should also look for traditional signs of a stolen vehicle, including: punched locks; peeled steering columns; multiple license plates; plates that do not match the vehicle description; plates that are temporarily attached to the car by use of wire or magnets; or no plates. Since stolen vehicles are usually abandoned once the operation is over, officers should also check abandoned vehicles in their jurisdiction. All recovered stolen vehicles should be thoroughly processed for evidence.

At a traffic stop, police officers should also carefully examine the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance. Red flags of possible criminal and/or terrorist activity include: the driver’s license and vehicle registration not being from the same state; an altered or forged license or title; a photograph on a driver’s license that does not match the driver’s appearance; and vehicle registration that is different than the name of the driver. While the driver or occupants are producing their identification, the officer may also have the opportunity to observe credit cards, long distance calling cards, and other documents in the person’s possession. The officer should attempt to see if the names on those credit cards and documentation match the name given or the name on the driver’s license. Different names obviously indicate a problem and a possibility of criminal activity.

Also, if a passport and international (or foreign) driver’s license are given to the officer, careful review of the documents are warranted as they may also indicate illegal entry into the country. Terrorists may also travel abroad, especially to terrorist-supporting countries (e.g., Syria and Iran) or where terror-training camps exist (e.g., Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Police should look at passports for signs of travel. Individuals possessing multiple identification instruments (e.g., passports, driver’s licenses, and social security cards) and different names is often a serious indicator of other wrongdoings (e.g., being in the country illegally, masking true identity, and financial crimes) (Alexander, 2006).

The occupants of the vehicle may also give off clues. Officers should look for inconsistencies such as inappropriate clothing. Terrorists may wear long sleeve shirts or coats in hot summer weather to conceal weapons, explosives (e.g., suicide bomb belt), illegal drugs, documents, and cash. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have instructed their operatives on how to appear “American.” In doing so, they would avoid calling attention to themselves by the public and law enforcement (Alexander, 2004). Members are instructed to shave beards, work on vocabulary and accents, and wear clothing such as T-shirts and blue jeans.

Terrorists may travel considerable distances from where they live to raise funds, recruit other members, or carry out terrorist attacks. Drivers and passengers that travel great distances may appear overly fatigued. Their hair and clothing may be unkempt or in disarray. There may be fast food containers, candy wrappers, soft drink bottles, and coffee cups in the car. All these variables are indicators of lengthy travel and should not be ignored. Some terrorists might be traveling with others in their group, including in single or multiple cars or vans.

Patrol officers should be attentive for C.B. antennas or walkie-talkie radios during a traffic stop as they are often indicators of persons traveling and communicating together. Also, cellular telephones, particularly of the disposable and pre-paid varieties, are in greater vogue among terrorists as they leave less of a paper trail. Parties involved in a terrorist plot tend to communicate frequently with each other. This is especially true, as it gets closer to the event.

During a traffic stop, officers should also look for things that are inconsistent or incongruous. One such example might be a driver claiming to be on a long vacation or a business trip not being in possession of any luggage. Since some terrorists are involved in illegal drug activity as a way to finance their activities, look for signs of drug smuggling: open windows in cold weather, scents being used to make interior odors, and air shocks to support added weight to the trunk. Likewise, a vehicle might be used to transport weapons and/or human cargo/illegal aliens.

“Traffic Stories”: Actual Encounters with Terrorists and Suspected Terrorists

Having addressed some aspects of terrorist indicators and best practices during a traffic stop, the authors now provide additional context by sharing actual patrol officer encounters with terrorists and suspected terrorists. They range from missed opportunities, decisive actions that prevented attacks, and instances where initial concerns proved meritless.

In December 2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disrupted a terrorist attempt to bomb a Rockford, Illinois, shopping mall planned for right before Chanukah and Christmas. Derrick Shareef appears to be a lone wolf who sought to undertake his version of “Jihad,” against Christian and Jewish Americans. Shareef planned a grenade attack at the shopping mall. This case was developed and ultimately foiled through the use of a confidential informant and an undercover FBI agent. The FBI agent posed as an illegal weapons dealer and negotiated with Shareef to exchange grenades for car stereos. Shareef was arrested in mid-December 2006 during an actual exchange of the contraband for the merchandise (Creglow, 2006).

Of note, police in DeKalb County, Illinois, had stopped Shareef for speeding in August 2005. In February and March 2006, the Genoa, Illinois, Police Department ticketed Shareef for driving without a license; the earlier incident included driving without insurance. (Curry, 2006). In hindsight, perhaps these repeat offenses should have resulted in subsequent inquiries to Shareef. Such questioning might have caused him to brag about his future plans. More extensive intelligence sharing between federal and state/local law enforcement in relation to this plot is another issue worth highlighting as it is representative of (somewhat) enduring remnants of mistrust to share content in relation to on-going operations.

In contrast, in August 2006, police in Ohio stopped two men on a traffic stop. During the stop the officer discovered that the men were in possession of $11,000 in cash, 12 cellular telephones, and airline passenger lists. Initial investigations suggested that the two were involved in terror financing, although subsequent inquiries demonstrated that the actions were benign (Ohio, 2006).

Other instances where traffic stops resulted in law enforcement interaction with terrorists prior to their attacks include the cases of Naveed Afzal Haq in July 2006 (Murakami, 2006) and Ziad Zamir Jarrah in September 2001 (Maryland, 2002). Haq’s pickup truck was stopped and ticketed by a Seattle police traffic officer for driving on a street where only buses were allowed. Seattle Police Chief Gil Kerlikowske noted that the officer who stopped Haq could not deduce that within under an hour Haq would attack the Seattle Jewish Federation office, kill one woman and injure five others (Murakami, 2006). Haq, who had two semi-automatic guns and large amounts of ammunition in the vehicle during the stop, claimed he undertook the attack because he “wanted the U.S. to leave Iraq, that his people had been mistreated, that the U.S. was arming Israel, and he didn’t care if he died” (Murakami, 2006, p. 1).

Again, in retrospect, whether additional queries by the officer would have made Haq nervous, act suspiciously, drive away, or possibly draw his weapon is impossible to say. It is probable that most similarly situated officers would not have uncovered the impending plot. With that said, post-9/11, aggressive, though constitutionally mindful, inquiries during a traffic stop may thwart future terror attacks.

Jarrah, a 9/11 hijacker on United Flight 93, was pulled over by Maryland State Trooper Joseph Cadalano on September 9, 2001, for speeding 90 miles per hour in a posted 65 miles-per-hour zone. Trooper Cadalano, who made the stop around midnight, issued a citation which bore a $270 fine to Jarrah, who signed the citation, accepted his two copies, and headed with his rented vehicle ultimately to the Newark New Jersey International Airport (Maryland, 2002). The ticket was found in the glove compartment at that airport. During the stop, “Jarrah was extremely calm and cooperative. The inside [of the car] was very clean. There were no books, or maps, or personal items or luggage in the passenger area of the vehicle. There was nothing evident to the trooper that gave any hint of what Jarrah was about to be involved in” (Maryland, 2002, p. 3).

On July 28, 2004, Iowa State Trooper Kenneth Haas stopped a vehicle whose driver was not wearing a seat belt. Michael Wagner, the driver, acted nervous, gave a false name, and could not produce identification. Haas searched Wagner’s vehicle. In doing so, Haas found a 9 mm pistol and a loaded magazine in the car’s back seat. A subsequent search uncovered “three bulletproof vests, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, a flight simulator and a bag of flight manuals” as well as “a 5-foot telescope hooked to camera equipment, night-vision goggles and a night-vision rifle scope” (Safranek, 2004, p. 1). Wagner, a convicted felon, also had books written in Arabic (including the Koran) in conjunction with other documents about the Iraq war and terrorism. Wagner and his passenger, Mrs. Wagner, are blacks who converted to Islam (Safranek, 2004; WFTV, 2004).

Wagner subsequently informed Iowa troopers on the scene that he had knowledge of terrorist activities, including al Qaeda and the Taliban, and possible terror plots in California. In May 2005, Wagner pled guilty to making false statements. He paid a $100 fine and agreed to assist with a homicide case. The charges of illegal possession of a firearm and body armor were dropped (NBC5I, 2005). Here, too, it was demonstrated that aggressive police questioning and a post-9/11 mindset can uncover contraband and possible terror plots.

In the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombing case, key players had to travel a considerable distance to purchase dynamite needed for their operation. The group had about 30 kilos of dynamite, but projected they would need about 150 kilos. The parties involved stole two vehicles for the purpose of transporting the illegal dynamite. On the way back from making the purchase, the terrorist suspects were stopped twice for speeding. They had the dynamite in the trunk. The actions of the occupants aroused the suspicion of the officer in each case. The officer requested a search of the vehicle. In both instances the suspects were able to thwart the search of the vehicle by paying the officers not to search the car (Sageman, 2006). Obviously, if a driver offers the officer a bribe not to conduct a search of the vehicle, then, bells should go off. Consider, too, calling for additional police units.

In that same bombing case, another officer stopped a vehicle after the incident. The occupants of the vehicle had twenty cellular telephones in their possession. The officer in this incident was diligent enough to record the serial numbers and telephone numbers of the phones the occupants had in their possession. Although on face value not a crime, the possession of the phones was a vital piece of evidence in the investigation and prosecution of the case. It turned out the police were able to establish links among co-defendants via the cell phones discovered by police during the stop (Sageman, 2006).

Being calm under pressure might have allowed Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian al Qaeda member, to succeed in bombing Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve in 1999. Fortunately, under intense questioning by U.S. Customs Inspector Diana Dean at the Port Angeles, Washington, port entry, Ressam appeared to be under stress. This prompted Dean to request Ressam to turn off the car, open the trunk, and get out of the vehicle. A subsequent inspection by Dean and Inspector Mike Chapman revealed explosive components (including nitroglycerin) in the vehicle’s trunk. Ressam’s subsequent attempt to escape on foot was unsuccessful. Ultimately, Ressam, who later assisted U.S. authorities with information about al Qaeda tactics, operations, and training camps, was sentenced to over twenty years in prison. Herein, suspicious behavior led law enforcement to uncover a terrorist—a calm Ressam and less intensive inquiries might have led to a successful Millennium Plot (Breton, Carter, Heath, and Neff, 2002).

The foregoing examples underscore the need for officers to be alert for, among other things, the contents of the vehicle and personal belongings in plain view. Things such as multiple passports, numerous long distance calling cards, multiple cellular telephones, maps, multiple credit cards, false identification, numerous alias names, translation guides and dictionaries, almanacs (e.g., FBI issued a warning that such books may be used by terrorists to find terror targets) (FBI, 2003), religious and foreign language reading material, and large amounts of cash are all possible indicators of terrorist-related activities. Such materials alone may not suggest terrorist-related activity. However, when weighed with other evidence indicative of a terror nexus, greater scrutiny of suspects and the totality of circumstances are mandatory.

Additionally, the number of vehicle occupants, their gender, age, demeanor and behavior (e.g., vehicle activity indicative of reconnaissance at a government building or school), time-of-day, location, model/make/age of vehicle, the size of vehicle (and whether the vehicle is rented), basis of stop (e.g., speeding, driving erratically, hit-and-run, or driving without a license) are part of the totality of circumstances that officers should weigh. Other factors of note in adducing a potential terrorist during a stop include plain view of weapons or components, unusual or large quantities of specific products such as disposable cell phones or fertilizers, or bumper stickers with anti-government or other extremist messages) (Alexander, 2004). So too, physical attributes, including hairstyle (e.g., shaved head) and tattoos (e.g., gang or extremist symbols) of drivers and passengers will give patrol officers some idea of what they might be up against, but these individuals might turn out be innocent (Anti-Defamation League, 2006b; Pitcavage, undated).

Terrorism Indicators and Calls for Service

The focus thus far has been on vehicle stops. However, these same guidelines apply to all calls for service. Police are regularly dispatched to respond to domestic disputes, neighborhood quarrels, robberies, arson, extortion, drug sales, and other criminal acts. Domestic disputes may indicate that a spouse is not happy with the increased radicalization of a husband or wife. Also, the non-radicalized spouse may have threatened to approach the police upon uncovering an impending terror plan (and was subsequently beaten by the radicalized spouse). Physical fights between former friends and neighbors may have a connection to one party rejecting the radical views of one who openly advocates violence in the name of a terror group.

A teenager involved in an extremist group might undertake violence against his parents or gain access to weapons stored at the home for use in an attack. Likewise, a college student living with his or her parents might become sympathetic to ALF and “animal rights.” This individual might shoplift to contribute to the group or vandalize a fast food chicken outlet. This involvement might be uncovered by parents and referred to police.

Ecoterrorist groups have been linked to arson attacks against business and government targets (Anti-Defamation League, 2006a). More specifically, the FBI estimated that between 1996 and 2002, ELF and ALF undertook about 600 criminal acts in the United States resulting in over $42 million in damages. In fall 1998, ELF admitted to setting fires at a Vail, Colorado, ski resort. In August 2003, over 100 sport utility vehicles were set on fire and vandalized in California (Alexander, 2004). An ELF member, William Jensen Cottrell, was sentenced to eight years in prison for the incidents (William, 2005). Officers responding to service calls arising from possible arson should also weigh possible connections to terrorism.

Terrorist groups may extort money from businesses, politicians, and nongovernmental entities. The terrorist group’s fee or protection-money affords victims’ freedom from physical violence, at least temporarily. Besides the payment of “revolutionary taxes,” other coercive activities include blackmailing military or police officials to either collaborate in criminal activity (e.g., drug trade) or suffer death. Terrorist groups and their sympathizers also bribe government officials worldwide in order to have more autonomy in conducting their terrorist operations. Service calls responding to allegations of extortion and bribery might have terrorism-related tentacles.

Police officers should constantly be mindful of gathering information and looking for clues. This also holds true when making criminal arrests. Some officers are satisfied with making arrests in criminal cases. An arrest may be just the tip of the iceberg. Criminal activity has been used to procure funding or launder money from ill-gotten gains to fund terrorist activities.

The U.S. government has been very effective in disrupting the funding of terrorist activities through traditional funding schemes (e.g., financial institutions and charities). This has led terrorist groups to turn with greater frequency to criminal acts to fund their activities (e.g., robberies, fraud, drug-trafficking). In the Madrid bombings in 2004, the terrorists traded drugs for dynamite. In September 2002, Hong Kong authorities arrested three men following their intention to purchase four Stinger anti-aircraft missiles for ultimate use by al Qaeda. They had sought to trade five tons of hashish and half a ton of heroin to fund the transaction (Alexander, 2004). Thus, criminal acts that in the pre-9/11 police officer mindset did not raise the possibility of having a connection to terrorism certainly should now.

Local bank or convenience store robberies might be undertaken to finance a terror plot in another part of the country or fund activities internationally. A December 2006 U.S. House of Representatives report acknowledges that Oklahoma City co-conspirator Terry Nichols participated in the robbery of an Arkansas gun dealer, which funded the April 1995 attack (FBI Rebuked, 2006). Thus, service calls related to any robbery or theft may have terrorist ties. The possibility of such connections should at least be considered.

As noted earlier, the presence of multiple or false identification cards might be indicative of terrorist activity. Terrorist groups counterfeit or obtain fraudulent government-issued documents such as driver’s licenses, immigration documents, and passports (e.g., 9/11 hijackers paid purveyors of illegal cards). The sale of fake identification cards (e.g., licenses) and documents (e.g., passports) to terrorists makes it more difficult for law enforcement to investigate and undermine terrorist activities. False documents enable terrorists to readily acquire products and services and access to capital.

Additionally, terrorist groups steal credit card information to produce counterfeit credit cards. These cards are sometimes used for identification or transported for their subsequent sale to other criminals. Additionally, terrorist groups undertake identity theft activities such as obtaining Social Security numbers and financial information (e.g., bank account or credit card numbers). With such data, terrorists request new checkbooks, ATM cards, credit cards, or transfer funds out a victim’s bank account. Therefore, calls for service relating to false identification cards, identity theft, credit card and bank fraud may have ancillary terrorist links.

In 1995, an astute deputy sheriff who was also working security at a tobacco wholesaler in North Carolina observed several men of Middle Eastern descent purchasing hundreds of cartons of cigarettes with frequency in cash-only transactions. These activities aroused the officer’s suspicion. Based upon that officer’s actions, a multi-year, broad investigation was launched. It was learned that several men were purchasing cigarettes in North Carolina, transporting them to Michigan, and selling them there. In June 2002, brothers Mohamad and Chawki Hammoud, originally from Lebanon, were found guilty of providing material support to the terrorist group Hezbollah (Mohamad) as well as undertaking cigarette smuggling, racketeering, and money laundering (Chawki) (Roig-Franzia, 2002).

If officers suspect terrorist activity, they should notify the proper authorities. This usually means starting by notifying a supervisor or watch commander. Police agencies would be well served to start their own terrorist databases. In addition, they should report such information to the FBI. The FBI has a database called the Violent Gang & Terrorist Offender Files (ViGTOF). Officers capture information on possible gang and terrorist offenders via stop cards. The information is then fed into a database to create profiles of suspects and their associates. Also, with the advent of state and regional intelligence fusion centers (e.g., Illinois Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center or STIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center of the FBI, additional content is available for the police officer to obtain and share with colleagues (Sheridan & Hsu, 2006). Under the STIC process, Illinois law enforcement officers may contact the center to inquire whether a suspect has any terror ties (STIC, 2006). This tool is particularly vital during a traditional traffic stop. Other resources include the National Counterterrorism Center, housed at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It serves as the primary U.S. government agency to integrate and analyze terrorism and counterterrorism intelligence (National, 2007).

An officer making a stop on a suspected terrorist may think they have useless information. That is not true. All information has merit; if not in your case then perhaps within your jurisdiction or elsewhere. Colleagues, state, and federal authorities should determine the utility of the information. Local agencies may not be aware of how involved a person is engaged in terrorist activities. They may have in fact stumbled on a new player. It is grass roots information that often yields the greatest value. No information should be deemed unworthy of reporting.

Law enforcement agencies should report their information or findings to their local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The first JTTF was created in New York in 1980. Today each state has at least one JTTF office, and some have several. In addition to their counter-terror operational and investigative functions, JTTFs serve as a clearinghouse for terrorism-related information.

Although numerous federal agencies work to gather intelligence on terrorist activity, state and local law enforcement are also in unique positions to gather intelligence. Terrorist cells live and operate in the very communities that state and local law enforcement serve. The line officer truly is the eyes and ears of the community. Line officers may well be the vital link to thwarting a major terrorist plot. They are likely to come into contact with these individuals.

Notes

Alexander, D. C. (2004). Business confronts terrorism: Risks and responses. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.

Alexander, D. C. (2006, May 7). Global terrorism threatens the world every day. Peoria Journal Star, p. A5.

Anti-Defamation League. (2006a). Ecoterrorism: Extremism in the animal rights and environmentalist movements. Retrieved December 27, 2006, from http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/Ecoterrorism.asp?LEARN_Cat=Extremism&LEARN_SubCat=Extremism_in_America&xpicked=4&item=eco

Anti-Defamation League. (2006b). Officer safety and extremists: An overview for law enforcement officers. Retrieved December 28, 2006, from http://www.adl.org/learn/safety/safety_Print.asp

Anti-Defamation League. (2006c). Ecoterrorism: Extremism in the animal rights and environmentalist movements. Retrieved December 27, 2006, from http://www.adl.org/learn

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